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COMMENT

TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AND INDIAN PARTICIPATION IN
INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
For centuries before the Europeans came upon North America, the rivers met the needs of the salmon and the salmon met the needs of the
Indian. The tribes and the salmon had benefited from this partnership,
secure in their adaptation to the environment and to each other. The Indians knew they had to protect the quality of the rivers. Under conditions of abundance, their religious and technological precautions ensured perpetuation of the fish.'
INTRODUCTION

From 1854 to 1855 the territorial Governor of Washington, Isaac Stevens,'
negotiated a series of treaties ("The Stevens Treaties" or "Treaties") with the
Indians then inhabiting the Pacific Northwest region west of the Cascade
Mountains and north of the Columbia River.' The Stevens Treaties cleared the
way for white settlement of the area. Stevens and the Indians negotiated these
Treaties at arms length, not as between a conqueror and the conquered.' Both
sides specified prerequisites for agreement. The Indians demanded guaranteed,
undiminished access to the salmon; Stevens required land for white settlement.
Stevens understood well the fishing needs of the Indians, and the language of the

1. Fay G. Cohen, Treaties on Trial 29 (1986).
2. President Pierce appointed the Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens, and Stevens also served
as the Indian Superintendent of Indian Affairs. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and
the National Forests: The Case of the Aboroginal Lands of the Nez Perce Tribe, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
435, 436 (1998).
3. See Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan.
22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point no Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty of Neah Bay,
Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty of Walla-Walla Valley, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty of
Olympia, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971.
4. See Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel]; see also Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 436-39 (describing
the negotiating skill of the Nez Perce and the strong arm tactics of Governor Stevens). Initially, the
United States negotiated all Indian treaties at arms length, and each treaty truly represented the
wishes of the parties. But, after the war of 1812, the United States began to exert its superior military
force to the detriment of the Indians. Treaties made during this period more closely resemble
adhesion contracts than arms length negotiations. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote three decisions
that formed the basis of Indian treaty interpretation, and helped bring the treaty result, but not the
process, back to even keel. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
Later Supreme Court decisions further supported Chief Justice Marshall's vision of "domestic
dependent nations." See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (stating that the
Indian tribes are communities dependent on the United States); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,
684-85 (1942) (noting that it is the United States' responsibility "to protect the interests of a
dependent people").
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Treaties clearly reflected that understanding.! In the Treaties, Stevens gained
vast quantities of Indian land for white settlement in exchange for the Indians'
continued access to tribal fishing grounds, small tracks of retained land, and
occasionally money.'
Each of the Stevens Treaties used essentially identical language to memorialize off-reservation Indian fishing rights: "The right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the territory."7 The fishing communities in the Pacific
Northwest, composed of both Indians and non-Indians have debated the meaning of these words since the early 1900's. At various times, the United States
Supreme Court has attempted to quell the debate. The Supreme Court's decisions provided that a reviewing court has a duty to interpret the Treaty language,
specifically the phrases "usual and accustomed" and "in common with the citizens," to effectuate the parties' intent at the moment of treaty formation Arguably those instructions have simply added uncertainty, as little evidence exists
regarding the parties' intent at the time of treaty formation.
In effect, the Supreme Court determined the parties' intent by considering
the parties' reasonable expectations.! Plainly read, the Treaties' language guarantees to the Indians access to their historic fishing grounds, and fish sufficient
to sustain their subsistence and commercial needs. By their nature, the Treaties
immediately fulfilled the United States' rights, but not the Indians.' The United
States frustrated the Indians reasonable expectations of continued access to fish
by actively contributing to the decline of salmon populations. As salmon stocks
have declined the Indians have been forced to forgo their treaty-based expectations and share in the consequences of white settlement."
Recent interpretations of the Treaties justify, if not demand, Indian participation in a host of salmon planning and conservation activities, including
habitat preservation" and international fisheries management." Yet, these decisions do not comport with the reasonable expectations of either the United States

5.
6.
7.
8.

See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676.
See id. at 676-77.
Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 2, art. Im.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675.

9. The phrase 'reasonable expectations" is a term of art borrowed from the law of close

corporations. See David C. Crago, Fiduciary Duties and Reasonable Expectations: Cash-Out
Mergers in Close Corporations,49 OK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996). Due to the nature of close corporations
(e.g., only a few shareholders who generally derive their income from their participation in running
the corporation), the majority shareholders may not act to frustrate the "reasonable expectations" of
the minority shareholders. "Reasonable expectations" typically include a voice in management of the
corporation and a reasonable return on investment. See id. The comparison is particularly close here,
as the Indians reasonable treaty expectations included continued access to the fish, and now Indians
enjoy a voice in management of the salmon fisheries. See infra Part HI.
10. Immediately prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fishing Vessel, the Indian's take of
salmon represented approximately two percent of the total harvest. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at
677 n.22.
11. See Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act,
Lessonsfrom the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999) (investigating the affect of listing
salmon as endangered species on fisheries management decisions).
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or the Indians. When Stevens negotiated the treaties, neither party anticipated
the need to manage the salmon, as the fish abundantly populated the Northwest's rivers. 3 The courts now attempt to safeguard the Indians' reasonable expectations of continued access to fish by mandating division of harvestable fish,
and, at least in part, Indian participation in fisheries management decisions.
This Comment considers the United States' attempts to manage pacific
salmon in light of its statutory requirements and the Indians' fishing rights. Part
I briefly describes the nature of the relationship between the United States and
the Northwest Indians. Part II outlines Indian fishing rights in the Northwest as
decided by the Supreme Court and two federal district courts. Part III outlines
pertinent Unites States' domestic and international obligations, and considers
Indian participation in international fisheries management. Part IV discusses
Indian participation in fisheries management decisions in the context of the
mechanisms discussed in Parts II and III. It continues with a brief discussion of
why Indian involvement may rest on a discretionary foundation. Finally, Part V
concludes that continued Indian participation in fisheries management decisions
benefits the overall salmon population.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIANS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

Salmon are anadromous fish." As such fish, they hatch in the clear, clean
headwaters of mountain streams, migrate to the ocean to grow to adults, and
then return to their hatching location to spawn and die.' Salmon require five
things to perpetuate the species: access to and from the ocean; fresh water of a
certain quality and quantity; clean gravel beds for spawning and hatching; food;
and protective cover." Taking too many salmon from one returning run means
that fewer salmon will reach their hatching grounds to spawn, and consequently
fewer of the offspring will return.
The Northwest Indians require salmon for survival today, just as they did in
1854 and 1855 when Stevens negotiated the Treaties. When the Indians fished
the Northwest's rivers alone, they harvested only the salmon they needed for
subsistence and trading. 7 In fact, salmon and Indian life in the Pacific Northwest
continue to be inseparable." The Indians rely now as they did in the 1800s on
salmon for subsistence, commercial livelihood, and religious rituals.' Because of
12. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 692 n.31 (noting that the International Pacific Salmon
Fisheries Commission may promulgate special Indian regulations).
13. See id. at 669.
14. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20.
15. There are five species of salmon (the Chinook, Coho, Chum, Pink, and Sockeye) and the
steelhead. The steelhead is actually an ocean trout. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 25. Unlike the
salmon that return to their native stream once to spawn and die, the steelhead may return to spawn
two or three times before death. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20.
16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 28.
17. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 24.
18. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20-23; see also United States v. Wahington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("One common cultural characteristic among all of the Indians was the
almost universal dependence upon the products of an aquatic community.").
19. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 20-25; see also Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 665-66;
Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 350.
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their dependence, the Indians take great care not to pollute the rivers and to fish
responsibly. 0 In the past, the Indians often opened traps and nets to release back
the salmon they caught, and "once the Indians had met their needs, they stopped
fishing."2' Each season, Indians performed elaborate religious ceremonies intended to ensure the salmon would return.2
White settlement in the Pacific Northwest during the late nineteenth century
contributed to a drastic decline in salmon populations for several reasons." First,
the population infusion simply meant more fishermen chased an essentially
fixed number of fish. Second, technological advances in fishing allowed fishermen to more efficiently remove salmon from the rivers and ocean. Third, the
recently perfected canning process expanded the salmon market beyond the
immediate vicinity of the Columbia River Basin. Finally, environmental factors, such as timber harvesting and dam building, depleted the habitat available
for salmon spawning.'
President Pierce empowered Governor Stevens to negotiate treaties with the
Indians,"0 and by 1854, the United States Supreme Court had judicially legitimized federal control over the Indians through the Commerce Clause and the
theory of "discovery and conquest."27 The courts have traditionally recognized
four sources of federal power over Indian tribes, two based in the Constitution
and two developed through the common law. The Commerce"' and Treaty
Clauses' form the Constitutional power, while the discovery' and trust responsibility' doctrines form the common law power. The Supremacy Clause 2 also
plays a significant role, but is not a direct source of federal power over Indian
tribes. Instead, it gives treaties and other federal legislation effect. Today, the
Federal Government exercises power over Indian tribes primarily through the
Commerce Clause and trust responsibility doctrine.
The Commerce Clause states, "Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."3' The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to

20.

See

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

COHEN, supra note 1, at 25.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 24
See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S at 668-69.
See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 352.
See COHEN, supra note 1, at 45-48.
See Act of March 3, 1852, 10 Stat. 226, 238.

COHEN,

supra note 1, at 24.

27. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 587-88 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60 (1832).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I1,§ 2.
30. The discovery doctrine was first outlined by Chief Justice Marshall in M'Intosh, when he
stated that "Conquest gives a title the courts of the conqueror cannot deny .... " Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) at 588.
31.

See generally FELIX COHEN, COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-21

(Rennard Strickland, et al. eds., 1982) (hereinafter FELIX COHEN).
32.

U.S. CONST. art. VI.

33.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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help define the unique relationship between Indians and the United States, and
to deny foreign nation status to the Indians.' Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia declared that the Commerce Clause "clearly contradistinguished [Indians] ... to themselves ... .'
The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power over Indians.'
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia recognized the legal relationship between the
United States and the Indian tribes. It described Indian tribes as "denominated
domestic dependent nations ... [whose] relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian."" The Commerce and Supremacy Clause's combined effect denies the power of state law in Indian country."
The nature of the "domestic dependent" relationship and formal promises
made by the United States gave rise to the trust responsibility doctrine." The
Supreme Court characterized the trust responsibility relationship as a fiduciary

duty, a special duty of protection, and a moral obligation." Formal promises in
treaties and other official United States actions made the trust responsibility
doctrine a moral imperative.' For instance, the Stevens Treaties promised the
Indians a perpetual home and access to the salmon in exchange for vast amounts
of land. These promises created a trust relationship." In practice, the trust relationship makes the United States act to enforce its treaty obligations against the
states, and serves as a check on federal mismanagement of tribal assets or bad
faith with regard to other federal authority."
The United States formalized its early relationship with Indians using treaties, as the federal government envisioned Indian tribes as independent, sovereign nations." Like other treaties, these "essentially [formed] a contract between

34. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1 (1831).
35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18.
36. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378
(1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); see also FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at
217 (explaining that "[pilenary does not mean 'absolute' in the sense that it may be exercised free of
constitutional limits or judicial review").
37. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 pet.) at 17.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1984) (defining "Indian country" as all land within the limits of a
reservation, all dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments).
39. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18. For a detailed discussion of the trust
responsibility doctrine, see generally FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at 220-21; STEVEN L. PEVAR,
THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 26-33 (2d ed. 1992), Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
40. See, e.g., Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384; Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1886); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S.
206, 225-26 (1983).
41. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is
That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 614-15 (1975) (stating the trust relationship can develop through
treaties, executive orders, agreements, statutes, and withdrawals by the Secretary of the Interior).
42. See PEVAR, supra note 39, at 26; See also Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 614.
43. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1585 (1996).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, grants the President power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate. However, in 1871 Congress passed a law prohibiting further
treaty making with the Indian Tribes. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1995).
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two sovereign nations."' Governor Stevens efficiently negotiated these treaties
with the Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. In his first year, Stevens secured millions of acres of land for white settlement." In exchange for Indian land, Stevens' treaties promised perpetual, undisturbed rights to reserved portions of land
(the Indian reservations), and "[tihe right [to take] fish at [the] usual... grounds
... in common with all the citizens of the [t]erritory... and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing [the fish] ..... .Stevens knew the tribes
would not agree to a treaty without specific guarantees of fishing rights, and he
intended to give those rights to them."
The Supreme Court established the so-called "cannons of treaty interpretation" out of the trust responsibility relationship." These canons guide judicial
interpretation of treaty language, essentially demanding that ambiguity be resolved liberally for the Indians," in terms favorable to the Indians," and in a
manner understood by the Indians." Still, the Supreme Court held that Congress
may use its plenary power over the Indians to abrogate treaty promises when
they clearly evince such an intention." The courts, however, will not lightly
assume that Congress acted to abrogated Indian treaty rights."
Using the cannons of treaty interpretation, the Supreme Court determined
that Indian treaties actually granted rights from the Indians to the United States,
and not from the United States to the Indians." The rights forfeited in treaties
simply derived from a larger, pre-existing body of inherent Indian rights." So,
treaties reserved to the Indians those rights not explicitly described or limited by
treaty."
II. NORTHWEST INDIAN TREATY FISHING RIGHTS AS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE
COURTS
A series of six Supreme Court decisions decided between 1905 and 1979
interpreted the measure and scope of Indian fishing rights encompassed in the
language of the Stevens Treaties." Through an examination of these decisions

45. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)).
46. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 666.
47. Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 3, art. III.
48. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 666 n.9.
49. See FELIX COHEN, supra note 3 1, at 221.
50. See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
51. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
52. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-76; Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631
(1970); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
53. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
54. See FELIX COHEN, supra note 31, at 222-23; Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690.
55. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
56. See generally id.
57. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
58. In chronological order, the decisions discussed include: United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371 (1905), Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392
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and a few additional, this section describes the rights retained by the Indians
after the Stevens Treaties. Those rights allow Indians to cross and temporarily
use private property to exercise the federally protected off-reservation fishing
rights, rights which they share with the citizens of the Pacific Northwest states.
A state may only limit the Indian rights through reasonable regulations, specifically necessary, and targeted for conservation.
Indian participation in fisheries management decisions became necessary,
because the last of the decisions discussed herein entitled the Indians to a significant portion of the harvestable salmon. Indian participation became necessary to meet Indians' reasonable expectations secured by treaty, to ensure the
salmon's survival, and to recognize private fishing interests. The cases not only
established the breadth of Indian fishing rights with respect to state regulation
and private property rights, but as set out below, they also provided the foundation and rationale for Indian participation in fisheries management decisions at
all levels.
A. From Winans to Puyallup III
The United States Supreme Court first construed the Stevens Treaty language in United States v. Winans." There, the United States sought to enjoin
Winans, a white settler, from excluding Yakima Indians from his property. The
United States asserted that the Winans' land bordered one of the Indians "usual
and accustomed" fishing grounds as provided by treaty, and as such, Winans
could not prevent the Indians from fishing in the area.' Winans had erected a
fishing wheel' in the Columbia River adjacent to his property under a license
issued by the State of Washington. The wheel so efficiently caught fish that it
effectively prevented the Indians from exercising their treaty rights. Winans
asserted that the treaty language, "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory[,]" conferred no
greater rights than those enjoyed by any other citizen whose land bordered the
6
river. '

The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that the treaty language preserved
for the Indians a non-exclusive, off-reservation fishing right, which held greater
significance than that asserted by Winans." The Court explained that an Indian
fishing right reserved in the Stevens Treaty was tantamount to an easement.' It

(1968), Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973), Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 433 U.S.
165 (1977), Wahington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
59. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
60. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
61. A fishing wheel resembles a Ferris wheel. It removes fish from a stream with great
efficiency. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 189 (1992). It may be
mounted either to the side of the river or on a floating platform. See id. It has a series of buckets
mounted about is circumference, and the river's current keeps it spinning. See id. If mounted in a
fortuitous location, it can scoop out great quantities of salmon. See id. One fishing wheel in 1906
was reported to remove 417,000 tons of salmon in one year. See id.
62. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 379.
63. Seeid. at 381.
64. See id. at 381.384.
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reserved to the Indians the right to cross and occupy private land' to the extent
the Indians needed access for fishing and erecting temporary shelters to cure
their catch.' The Indians could assert this right against the United States and
subsequent grantees.'
Unfortunately for the Yakimas and other Northwest Indians, the Winans
decision was flawed in a manner not immediately apparent. In the dicta following the denial of Winans' claim, the court professed an unsupported and therefore unsubstantiated grant of power to the states to regulate the Indians' offreservation treaty fishing rights."
In Tulee v. Washington,6" the Supreme Court did little more than solidify its
dicta announcement in Winans by holding that a state could regulate Indian
fishing rights for conservation purposes. The state of Washington charged and
convicted a Yakima Indian of netting salmon without a fishing license." Washington asserted that its power to conserve fish and game permitted it to require a
license of the Indian plaintiff." The State of Washington argued that the license
requirements were not inapposite to the Yakima's treaty rights, since the requirements were not discriminatory." The Court decided Washington could
regulate the "time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as... necessary
for the conservation of fish," but it may not charge a license fee. 3 The court
found the license fee, as applied, was "not indispensable to the effectiveness of a
state conservation program," but impermissibly limited a federal right.'
In a series of three Puyallup" decisions dating from 1968 to 1977, the Court
further honed its interpretation of Stevens Treaty language. In Puyallup I,
Washington" contested the Indian's refusal to adhere to off-reservation, statefishing regulations. The regulation at issue prescribed fishing for steelhead trout
only recreationally with hooks and not commercially with nets. 7 The Indians
'

65. Winans is distinguished from Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919), the
subsequent Supreme Court case to interpret Stevens' treaty language, by the character of the land
involved. In both cases the Yakima Indians asserted their fishing rights. See Seufert, 249 U.S. at 19596; Winans, 198 U.S. at 377. Winans' land was previously ceded to the United States by treaty with
the Yakimas. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 377. The land in Seufert belonged to another tribe. See
Seufert, 249 U.S. at 197. In Seufert, the Court held the Stevens' treaty language also retained for the
Yakimas the right to fish. Id. at 199.
66. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
67. See id. at 381-82.
68. See id. at 384 (stating: "Nor does it restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the
regulation of the right" to regulate Indian fishing).
69. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
70. See Tulee, 315 U.S. at 682.
71. See id. at 683.
72. See id. at 683-84.
73. Id. at 684.
74. Id. at 685.
75. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup 1]; Washington
v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup II]; Puyallup Tribe v. Washington, 433
U.S. 165 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup III].
76. The Department of Game regulates the steelhead fishery, while the Department of
Fisheries regulates the salmon fishing. See Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 46.
77. See Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 396.
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targeted by the State of Washington used nets for commercial fishing from before the date of the treaty to the time of the suit." The Court reiterated the Winans dicta ratified by Tulee, and held that the state's police power allowed nondiscriminatory regulation of off-reservation Indian treaty fishing rights to the
extent necessary for conservation, provided the regulations met appropriate
standards. ' The court's holding foreclosed the state's ability to charge treaty
Indians a fee to exercise their treaty fishing right.' The Court declined to decide
whether the state may properly prohibit Indian net fishing in the name of conservation, as the lower state court had not collected sufficient evidence to decide
whether the net prohibition was a "'reasonable and necessary' conservation
measure. ... ""
The Court, however, concluded that any final determination of the conservation question must be shaped to give meaning to the phrase "in common with"
as used in the Treaties. 2 In other words, the Court limited state regulatory powers over off-reservation Indian fishing to those actions that do not completely
frustrate off-reservation Indian fishing rights in the name of conservation. Impliedly, the Court would find any state conservation regulation that completely
eliminated net fishing for salmon improper.
In Puyallup II, the Court again considered the permissibility of Washington's regulation of off-reservation Indian fishing in the context of a prohibition
on using nets for steelhead fishing." The Court considered whether the blanket
prohibition on nets discriminatorily affected Indians, as the regulation seemingly
apportioned the entire steelhead run to sport fishermen as Indians did not fish by
hook." Based on Washington's allocation of some, albeit limited, fish to sport
fishermen, the Court found Washington's regulations discriminatory ." In other
words, because Washington permitted limited fishing, some fish were available,
and the Indians must be given their share. The Court declined to definitively
divide the take between sport and net fishermen, as that exercise involved impermissible fact-finding." Therefore, it remanded the case to the trial court for an
expert apportionment between Indian-net and sport-hook fishermen." The
Court's holding recognized sufficient state police power to apportion the fish
and to prevent the fish's extinction by net fishing. The Court stated that the

78. See id.
79. See id. at 398-99 (indicating that the state may not "qualify" the Indians' right to fish,
"[b]ut the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing and the like
may be regulated ...in the interest of conservation").
80. See id. at 399.
81. Id. at 401 (citing Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 422 P.2d 754, 764 (Wash.
1967)).
82. Id. at 403 (reiterating the Stevens treaty language "The right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the
territory") (emphasis added).
83. See Puyallup II,
414 U.S. at 46.
84. See id. at 46-47.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 48-49.
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treaty did not "give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead
until it enters their nets." 8"
On remand of Puyallup H, the Washington State Supreme Court heard expert testimony and issued an order that apportioned the steelhead between the
Indians and the sport fishermen." This state court order set the stage for the last
of the Puyallup decisions, Puyallup III.' After struggling with sovereign immunity issues, the Court, in Puyallup III, narrowed the question to whether the state
could regulate on-reservation Indian fishing rights for conservation purposes.'
This differs from the previous cases, as the other cases involved state regulation
of off-reservation fishing rights. The Court examined the nature of Indian reservations in light of the treaty language " and the allotment program, " and decided
that on-reservation state regulation was necessary to give effect to Washington's
overall steelhead conservation programY Therefore, where the Indian's onreservation actions could completely frustrate statewide conservation programs,"
the Court permitted state regulation."
B. Sohappy v. Smith"7
In Sohappy, the Indian plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the
State of Oregon Fish and Game Commission," seeking a decree to define "their

88. Id.
89. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 172 (explaining the case history).
90. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
91. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 165.
92. Article II of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, the subject treaty, states "the Puyallup
Reservation was to be 'set apart, and so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their
exclusive use' .... " See id. (citing Treaty of Medicine Creek, Mar. 3 1893, art. i, 10 Stat. 1132).
93. The General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act) 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381(1983)). The Dawes Act required the
President to allot Indian reservation lands to the Indians with the excess available for white
settlement or purchase by the federal government. The federal government held land allotted to the
Indians in trust for 25 years, when it was then available for patent to the Indians. The Indians could
either retain the land or sell it as any other landowner could. The Dawes Act was an assimilative tool
meant to "civilize" the Indians and make farmers of them. In fact it succeeded only to the extent that
reservations were settled by whites, and Indian land base was further eroded. See FELIX COHEN,
supra note 31, at 130-31. The Court in Puyallup 111 found it persuasive that, after the allotments, the
extent of the land in trust status amounted to only 22 of the previous 18,000-acre reservation, and
none bordered the Puyallup river. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 174.
94. See Puyallup 111, 433 U.S. at 175.
95. See id. at 176.
96. The question of state regulation of on-reservation fishing rights is not completely settled.
Here, the original reservation was substantially diminished from the original 18,000 acres, and none
of the remaining trust land was located adjacent to the river. In 1980, the Supreme Court decided
that Indians could not regulate non-Indian fishing on allotted land located within the reservation. See
generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1980) (noting that although this decision speaks
to Indian regulation of non-Indian fishing on privately owned land within the reservation, it also
approves state regulation of fishing on reservation land).
97. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). This case properly fits in chronological order between
Puyallup I and 11. It is included because here to help unify the Puyallup decisions, and because it
was cited approvingly by Judge Boldt in his decision that follows. See infra notes 104-107, and
accompanying text.
98. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp at 903.
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treaty right 'of taking fish at the usual and accustomed places' on the Columbia
River" within the context of existing state regulations." Citing with approval
Puyallup I, the court reasoned that state regulation of off-reservation Indian
fishing rights must fulfill three requirements. The regulations must: (1) be necessary for conservation; (2) not discriminate against Indians; and (3) meet "appropriate standards."'" The court distinguished state regulation of non-Indian
fishermen from treaty Indian fishermen by holding that: "The state may not
qualify the federal right by subordinating it to some other state objective or policy. It may use its police power only to the extent necessary to prevent ...
[practices]... that... imperil the continued existence of the fish resource .....
This restricted regulatory authority is distinct from the power a state wields
over non-Indian fishing rights, which is limited only by the state's organic legislation and the reasonableness standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" In
effect, Sohappy made Oregon consider the Indian fishing community as a regulated body outside the previously existing sport and commercial fisheries. Sohappy is particularly instructive here, because it interpreted the Stevens treaty
language to ensure the Indians a "fair share" of salmon. '
C. United States v. Washington"
In United States v. Washington, the United States brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to settle the Indians' off-reservation treaty fishing
rights. By joining all interested parties and seeking jurisdiction to decide all
related claims, Senior District Judge Boldt intended to resolve the Indian fishing
question once and for all.'"' From extremely comprehensive historical evidence
supported by expert testimony and pertinent constitutional, statutory, and common law, Judge Boldt interpreted the Stevens treaty language"' with all possible
deference to the Indians."'' Judge Boldt fundamentally based his decision on the

99. Id. (quoting the Stevens treaty language).
100. Id. at 907.
101. Id. at 908.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 911.
104. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). This case properly fits in chronological order
between Puyallup II and III. It is discussed here to give unity to the Puyallup decisions and to better
lead into the discussion of the subsequent and final Supreme Court ruling on the Stevens treaty
language.
105. At this point, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled favorably for state regulation of onreservation fishing as necessary for conservation. See supra notes 89-96, and accompanying text.
106. See supra, notes 39-43, and accompanying text. The Treaty of Medicine Creek is typical
of the language in all II treaties under consideration in Fishing Vessel.
107. In fact, Judge Boldt desired to go even further, but was restrained by precedent. The
decision analyzed a state's right to regulate off-reservation fishing consistent with the police power
used to regulate non-Indian fishing. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 334. Judge Boldt concluded the
state's authority to regulate off-reservation Indian fishing was derived from dicta first appearing in
Ward v.Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 335. Apparently the
Supreme Court carried that dicta through subsequent decisions without constitutional or statutory
justification. Judge Boldt expressed concern regarding a state's ability to control a federal right
without express delegation of such power. See id. at 337. Despite these concerns, precedent
demanded that Judge Boldt hold that a state may regulate Indian off-reservation fishing where such
regulation is strictly limited to measures "reasonable and necessary to prevent demonstrable harm to
the actual conservation of fish." Id. at 342. The court further defined reasonable and necessary
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difference between pre-existing, inherent Indian right, ' and a privilege regulated
by the state pursuant to its police power. Practically, the decision fulfilled the
Indian's reasonable expectations they held when they signed the treaty. It
granted the Indians unobstructed access to salmon and a specific quantity of
salmon. Further, by specifically granting Indians half of the available fish and
not just an ambiguous right to fish, the decision mandated that Indians be
granted a voice in fisheries management. The only way that non-Indians could
now increase the size of their catch was to increase the overall number of
salmon available. Since Indians now controlled half of the fish, their participation was essential.
In the context of history and the law, the decision systematically described
the meaning of the treaty phrase, "[tihe right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common
with all citizens of the territory .... '"' Judge Boldt decided the phrase guaranteed the Indians off-reservation fishing essentially everywhere."' The right was
subject to only very narrow state regulation," and its measure amounted to the
opportunity"' to take up to fifty percent of the "harvestable fish .... This fifty
percent dedicated to the tribe did not include fish required for personal subsistence or ceremonial purposes, as those purposes were "special" and "distinct"
from commercial purposes." Also, the Indians' harvestable portion did not in-

within the context of the state regulation to mean "appropriate to its purpose ... and essential to
conservation." Id. The court also required hearings with meaningful Indian participation prior to
affecting state regulation of Indian off-reservation fishing rights. The decision found that the state
had the burden of proof regarding reasonable and necessary. See id.
108. It is convenient to think of Indian fishing "rights" like the "right" to free speech
guaranteed in the First Amendment. Read carefully, the First Amendment does not grant a right, but
restricts congressional power. "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech...
." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Amendment implies an inherent freedom that may not be abridged,
absent another constitutional amendment. Similarly, the Court interpreted Indian treaties as a grant
of rights from the tribe to the United States. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
As such, the treaty phrase "the right of taking fish at all usual ... places ... in common with the
citizens of the territory[,] .... " implies a grant of rights to the citizens, with the Indians retaining an
inherent right to fish. It is the citizens' powers that are qualified and not the Indians' rights. Like the
First amendment, a clear expression is necessary for congress to abrogate a right.
109. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 331 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
110. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 332.
Ill. See id. at 342.
112. Mandating that granting the Indians a right to 50% of the harvestable fish would be
paramount to establishing a property right in free swimming fish. By couching the Indians' rights in
terms of an opportunity, the court preserves the long established belief that wild animals do not
become property until reduced to possession. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1896).
113. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343. Harvestable fish is a term of art defined by Judge
Boldt as that quantity of fish available for catching by all fishermen. See id. It is calculated by
subtracting from the entire number of fish in a run destined for the Indians' usual and accustomed
fishing grounds, the number of fish required for "spawning escapement and tribal needs." See id.
Essentially the harvestable fish are those fish at least partially under state control. See id. at 343.
114. See id. at 343. No court has addressed the Indian take in terms of the Indians' right to a
quantity, other than a portion of fish. Granted, fish runs vary from year to year, but when the Indians
signed the treaty they surely envisioned, at a minimum, they would retain their then existing
lifestyle. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 576 (1908) (extrapolating that the treaty should reserve to the Indians an amount of fish
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clude the fish taken by Indians on the reservation.'" Finally, Judge Bolt's decision mandated that Washington use its position on the International Pacific
Salmon Fisheries Commission to promote Indian fishing rights."' As discussed
below, Ninth Circuit's'" and Supreme Court's indirect review left Judge Boldt's
decision substantially intact.
D. Washington v. Washington Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Association"'
In Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court indirectly reviewed Judge Boldt's
decision, and largely vindicated tribal fishing rights. This most recent Supreme
Court review of Stevens' treaty language, holds that the language "the right of
taking fish" intended to secure in the Indians not merely equal access to fishing,
but a specific share of the harvestable fish that pass through tribal fishing
areas."' The Court interpreted the right as a specific share, because of the predictable quantities of fish associated with anadromous fish runs."' This case
succinctly summarized the parties' intentions under the Stevens Treaties as follows:
Nontreaty fishermen may not rely on property law concepts, devices
such as the fish wheel, license fees, or general regulations to deprive
the Indians of a fair share of the relevant runs of anadromous fish in the
case area. Nor may treaty fishermen rely on their exclusive right of access to the reservations to destroy the rights of other "citizens of the territory." Both sides have a right, secured by treaty, to take a fair share of
the available fish. That, we think, is what the parties to the treaty intended when they secured to the Indians the right of taking fish in
common with other citizens."'
The court concluded that the harvestable portion of the fish should be
equally divided between treaty and non-treaty fishermen, and that the half allocated to the Indians represented a maximum."' If less than half sufficiently provided ' the Indians with a "moderate living,"'".. then that amount constituted their
take."

necessary to sustain a moderate living, and that the balance of the harvestable portion would be
available for non-treaty fishermen).
115. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 344.
116. See id. This requirement is necessary to ensure the harvestable fish include all those
destined for the Indians' "usual and accustomed grounds and stations." See id.at 343.
117. The Ninth Circuit's review modified Judge Boldt's holding in one respect. It indicated any
"equitable adjustment" made to the Indians' share of the harvestable portion of fish should not
consider those fish taken by fishermen outside Washington's jurisdictional reach. See United States
v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
118. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
119. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
120. See id. at 678 & 663. The Court equated management of anadromous fisheries to farming
because of the predictable harvest associated with both endeavors. See id at 663.
121. Id. at 684-85.
122. See id. at 685-86.
123. The Supreme Court based this moderate living concept on one of its previous cases where
an Indian treaty was interpreted to reserve sufficient water for the Indians to make a moderate living.
See Arizona v.California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983).
124. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685.
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The Court's decision differed from Judge Boldt's in two respects, and both
reduced the Indian's take. First, the Court did not exclude from the Indians'
treaty share those fish caught on the reservation."' In so holding, the Court alluded to Puyallup III, where it allowed on-reservation state regulation where
necessary to prevent frustration of a statewide conservation plan.'26 Second, the
Court ruled that fish caught for subsistence or ceremonial purposes counted
against the tribes' allocation in the same manner as fish caught for commercial
purposes. 7
With the exception of state regulation over Indian fishing both on and off the
reservation, the Court's interpretation of the Stevens treaty language preserved
the tribe's reasonable expectations at the treaty's inception. ' Fundamentally, the
Indians' reasonably expected access to usual and accustomed fishing grounds
and an opportunity to catch a specific portion of the fish. In 1854, neither party
envisioned the current decline in the salmon population. Further, because the
Court allocated to the Indians a significant portion of the salmon run year in and
year out, the decision cemented the necessity for Indian participation in fisheries
management decisions. With the treaty obligations of each party outlined, the
next section presents the mechanisms for Indian participation in fisheries management and comments on the continuing nature of their participation.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE EFFORTS TO INCLUDE INDIANS IN FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
The Indians occupy important decision-making positions in both domestic
and international fisheries management. Domestically, Congress first formally
included Indians in fisheries management decisions when it passed two pieces of
important legislation, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,2
and the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. ' "
Internationally, the United States recognized Indian interests in multilateral and
bilateral agreements, including the Law of the Sea, and its Straddling Stock and
Highly Migratory Fish agreement, and the Pacific Salmon treaties with Canada.
This section briefly outlines pertinent sections these acts and agreements and
comments on Indian participation in fisheries management decisions related to
each.
A. The Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976
Congress took its first step to revitalize the diminishing salmon stocks by
enacting the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) or Magnuson
125.
126.
127.

See id.
at 687.
See id. at 687 n.28.
See id. at 688-89.

128. Indian treaties are likened to adhesion contracts-liberally construed in favor of the
weaker party. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 617. "The goal is to achieve the
reasonable expectations of the weaker party." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 41, at 617-18.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994). Commonly known as the Magnuson Act for Washington
Senator Warren Magnuson, the Act's chief sponsor. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel Keith
Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary
Common PropertyResource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 17,48-49 (1983).
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994).
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Act. The FCMA, a controversial piece of legislation, established a "fishery conservation zone" extending 200 nautical miles "from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured."' Prior to 1976, the United States asserted jurisdiction over fishing only within the limits of the territorial sea. The FMCA granted
the United States exclusive management authority over all fish' 2 within this
extended "fishery conservation zone, ....
and regulated salmon even beyond the
limits of the "fishery conservation zone.""
In recognition of the anadromous nature of salmon, Congress opted to regulate their entire migratory range. Accordingly, through the FCMA, Congress
gave the United States exclusive management authority over all anadromous fish
originating in the United States and throughout their migratory range.' This
comprehensive management scheme effectively prevented foreign fishing vessels from taking salmon just outside the "fishery conservation zone," which
frustrated domestic conservation measures."' By asserting management authority
throughout the salmon's entire migratory range, Congress acted outside the existing boundaries of international law."' Congress restrained its vigor authority,
however, by not extending jurisdiction under the FMCA into "any foreign nation's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent... recognized by the United States.' 3.
The FCMA established eight regional fisheries councils under the supervision of the federal government. ' FMCA provisions tasked each council with
preparing management plans, which regulated fisheries under each council's
control, consistent with the FMCA's national standards."' These plans were
adopted in a manner similar to federal agency rulemaking procedures, and included notice, public Comment, and publication in the federal register."' The
FCMA guaranteed Indian participation in fisheries management decisions
through an Indian position on the appropriate councils."'

131.
16 U.S.C. § 1811. The territorial sea extends three nautical miles from the shore. See
Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 49. Warren Magnuson asserts that extending the United
States' regulatory authority to 200 nautical miles helped establish a new rule of customary
international law. See Warren Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976:
FirstStep Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries,52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 427 (1977).
132. The United States does not have management authority over "highly migratory species of
tuna." 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 51.
137. See Wilkinson & Conner, Supra note 129, at 51.
138. See 16 U.S.C. § 1812.
139. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 52. The two councils concerned with salmon
resources are the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, and the Pacific Fishery Management
Council. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 52. The Pacific council was granted
responsibility for managaging of salmon originating within California, Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (a)(6).
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (g)-(h).
141. See id. §§ 1852 (h)(3) & 1855(c)(3)(A).
142. See id. § 1852 (b).
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B. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planningand ConservationAct"'
In 1980, Congress enacted the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act (the Act). Through the Act, Congress melded the hydroelectric power generation reality of the Columbia River Basin with the conservation goals for anadromous fish. The Act intended to "protect, mitigate, and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, of
the Columbia River and its tributaries, particularly anadromous fish... which
are dependent on suitable environmental conditions substantially obtainable
from management ...

of the Federal Columbia River Power System ..

.

Prior to passage of the Act, the Federal Columbia River Power System did not
bear the destructive cost of the salmon fishery wrought by federal dam building,
nor was it passed to the power consumers. Instead, the federal government externalized the cost.'5 The Act internalized this cost by providing, among other
things, water-releases to meet fish preservation and mitigation needs.'"
Significant to the discussion here, the Act created the Northwest Power
Planning Council."' The Northwest Power Planning Council effectively removed
fisheries management decisions from those with significant interests in the
power industry."' Eight members, two each from Washington, Oregon, Idaho,
and Montana composed the Council.' 9 The Act charged the Council with developing and implementing a comprehensive fish plan, consistent with the purposes
of the Act.'5 ' The Act ensured Indian participation in the rulemaking process
through explicit designation of notice and Comment by Indian tribes prior to
rule adoption.''

143. 16 U.S.C. 9§ 839-839h (1994).
144. Id. § 839(6).
145. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 55. Cost externalization is a common pool
problem described by Hardin in his article on the tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). A tragedy of the commons occurs where
a common resource is open to all. In this case, fishing is open to all. The ability of the resource (fish)
to sustain itself is limited by its capacity for reproduction. Each fishermen wants to maximize his
profit. To do this, each must take as many fish as possible. There is no incentive to decrease the
fishing take, because a fish lost to one fishermen is one gained by another. Eventually the number of
fish taken exceeds the fish's capacity to reproduce. When this occurs, the entire resource declines,
and may eventually be lost.
146. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 129, at 55. See also 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(E)(ii).
Releasing water from behind the Columbia River dams has at least two significant effects. First, it
provides additional water flow to ease the salmon's upstream spawning run, and second, it forgoes
the electric power generation potential of the water, thereby externalizing the cost of power
generation.
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(A).
148. See Wilkinson & Conner, supranote 129, at 55-56.
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2).
150. See id. § 839b(h)(1 1)(A).
151. See id. § 839b(h)(4)(A).
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C. The Law of the Sea"2
In 1982, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Articles 55 through 75 of the UNCLOS describe the rights and
duties of states (countries) with regard to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
UNCLOS defines the EEZ as extending "200 nautical miles from the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.'.. Within the EEZ, the
coastal state enjoys exclusive rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
the living and non-living natural resources within the seabed and superjacent
water." The coastal state determines the allowable fish catch within the EEZ, '
and promotes optimum utilization of the resource." Articles 63 and 64 provide
for coordination among states where fish stocks occur within, or migrate through
the EEZ of more than one state.
The UNCLOS gives special consideration to anadromous fish species. Article 66 grants primary responsibility for anadromous fish species to their country
of origin."7 The UNCLOS requires states of origin to conserve and to regulate
anadromous fish in the area landward of the outer limit of its EEZ."' The UNCLOS encourages coordination between interested states in their regulation of
the overall catch of anadromous fish, even where the fish occurred outside a
state's EEZ.' The UNCLOS also asks the states where anadromous fish originate and other interested states to implement fisheries regulations through regional organization."' The UNCLOS does not provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the state of origins' regulations, but instead it
advocates for coordination between affected states."'
In 1993, the U.N. Conference on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks met to consider current conservation and management provisions
outlined in the UNCLOS."' The Conference intended to improve cooperation
and communication between states that managing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks." The Conference produced the Fish Stock Agreement, a binding treaty."

152. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
153. See UNCLOS art. 57.
154. See id. at art. 56.
155. See id. at art. 61.
156. See id. at art. 62.
157. See id. at art. 66 § 1.
158. See id. § 2.
159. See id. § 3. See also Karol de Zwager Brown, Truce in the Salmon War: Alternatives for
the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 74 WASH. L. REV. 605,617 (1999) (describing the UNCLOS).
160. See UNCLOS art. 66 § 5.
161. See id. at art. 66 § 3(d).
162. See Julie R. Mack, InternationalFisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on
Straddlingand Highly MigratoryFish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishingon the High Seas, 26 CAL.
W. INT'L L. J.313, 324-25 (1996).
163. See Brown, supra note 159, at 618.
164. Brown, supra note 159, at 619. Apparently there was initial disagreement between Canada
and the United States whether as tothe conference should result in a binding or non-binding treaty. In
the end, Canada succeeded, and the conference adopted a binding treaty. See The Implementation of
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The Fish Stock Treaty accomplished its objectives through existing or newly
created regional management organizations."' The treaty required all "real interest."" states to become members of the appropriate regional organization, lest
they be banned from fishing the regulated stocks in the subject region."' The
treaty tasked regional organizations with identifying stocks within their region
and adopting regulations after considering the specific characteristics of the
region. ' State members of the regional organizations were granted power to
enforce regulations on the high seas within their region against non-members.
Enforcement mechanisms included powers to board, to inspect, and possibly to
order offending vessels to the nearest port."' The Fish Stock Treaty intended to
develop and enforce high-seas fishing regulations. Indians participate in international fisheries management decisions under the Law of the Sea and its associated treaties through their participation on the council established under the
FMCA. '
D. Pacific Salmon Treaty
In 1985, the United States and Canada reached an agreement to jointly manage the pacific salmon originating within their rivers."M This treaty was recently
amended in 1999.72 The treaty provided guidelines for managing six fisheries,
some by the fish's area of origination, others by species of fish."' Two governing
principles gave the treaty form-the conservation and equity principles.'" The
conservation principle demanded that "each party shall 'prevent overfishing and
The equity principle gave
provide for the optimum production' of salmon .....
each country "benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its
waters."...

the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea relating to Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.164/37 (1995) [hereinafter Fish Stock Treaty]. The Fish Stock Treaty does not
become effective until ratified by 30 states. Currently 59 states are signatories and 24 have ratified it,
including both the United States and Canada. See <http//www.un.org/depts/los/los/164st.htm>.
165. See Mack, supra note 162, at 326. Some of these organizations were created as suggested
in UNCLOS, art. 66 § 5, or they were already in existence.
166. A state with a "real interest" is defined as a state fishing for straddling or migratory fish
stocks regulated by a regional organization or fishing in the region. See Fish Stock Treaty art. 8 § 3.
167. See id. at art. 8 § 4.
168. Seeid. atart.8§ 1.
169. See id. at art. 21.
170. See supranotes, 131 -142 and accompanying text.
171. Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No.
11,091, at 7 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty]. For a detailed
discussion of various aspects of the treaty, see Brown, supra note 159. The treaty was necessary
because, despite domestic efforts to rejuvenate the salmon population, Canada intercepted a
significant number of salmon as they passed the Canadian coast bound for Alaska. See WILKINSON,
supra note 61, at 213.
172. See Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., 1999
U.S.T. 112 (entered into force June 30, 1999).
173. See Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091, at 17-30.
174. See Brown, supranote 159, at 626.
175. Brown, supra note 159, at 626; see also Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091, at 7.
176. Brown, supra note 147, at 626; see also Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 171, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,091, at 7.
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Indian tribes played a significant role throughout the Pacific Salmon treaty
negotiations." The tribes filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior, and the
states of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon as the parties negotiated the treaty."'
The Indians claimed that the federal government and the state governments improperly allocated salmon resources as provided under the treaties negotiated by
Governor Stevens."' Specifically, the tribes demanded that the United States
consider Alaska's take when it determined the harvestable portion of fish.'" That
ongoing lawsuit essentially stalled the treaty negotiations. Neither the United
States nor Canada was willing to enter into a binding treaty before the status of
the tribes' take was reconciled with Alaska."'
The legislation enacted by Congress to implement the Pacific Salmon Treaty
reserved Indian participation in fisheries management. "2 - The implementing legislation established a four-member Commission to represent the United States in
fisheries management decisions."' The legislation provided that one member of
the Commission come from a list of candidates created by the treaty Indian
tribes.'"
IV. CONTINUED INDIAN PARTICIPATION IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Judge Boldt's 1974"' decision sparked Indian inclusion in fisheries management from that point forward. That decision, essentially affirmed two years
later by the United States Supreme Court,"' effectively apportioned half of the
harvestable salmon population to the Indians. Due to the large quantity of fish
now controlled by the Indians, Federal and state governments could no longer
ignore their rights.
In 1976, shortly after Judge Boldt's decision, Congress passed the Magnuson Act, which officially included Indians in federal fisheries management decisions. One of the Magnuson Act's eight regional fisheries management, the
Pacific Fisheries Management Council, developed fisheries management plans
for salmon originating in from California, Washington, Idaho and Oregon. Congress ensured Indian participation in salmon management by guaranteeing that
one member of the Council was an Indian.

177. The Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (CRITFC), a group composed of four
Columbia River tribes, helped bring the parties together for the treaty negotiations. See Brown.
surpa note 159, at 621
178. See Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Baldrige, 605 F.Supp.
833 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
179. See id.
180.

See Thomas C. Jensen, The United States-CanadaPacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An
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In 1980 and 1985 the federal government again sought to include Indians in
fisheries management decisions. In 1980 Congress passed the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. Then, in 1985, the United States
and Canada agreed to the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Both instruments had mechanisms to include Indians in fisheries management decisions. The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act promoted Indian involvement by specifically providing Indian with authority to comment on proposed
rules fisheries conservation rules prior to their adoption. The Pacific Salmon
Treaty gave Indians a voice in fisheries management by mandating that one
member of the enacting Commission be selected from a list provided by the
Indians. So, the federal government involved Indians in fisheries management
decisions on both national and international levels.
Continued Indian participation in fisheries management decisions could
erode as quickly as it arose. Felix Cohen described the change in the federal
government's relationship with Indian tribes using the following words: "Like
the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in
our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith...
In 1953, through Public Law 280,"' Congress granted certain states criminal
and some civil jurisdiction over Indian and Indian reservations.'" In this manner,
Congress exercised plenary power over the Indian tribes and abrogated treaty
rights. "' In a similar fashion, Congress could grant the entire share of salmon to
commercial fishermen.
In 1996, David Getches"' described the end of the Modem Era" - and the
coming of the new subjectivism in Indian jurisprudence.'9 3 Central to Getches'
thesis that the value of precedent in Indian law was disappearing was a quote
attributed to Justice Antonin Scalia," made as the Justice considered a case involving tribal criminal jurisdiction" ' over non-member Indians.'" Justice Scalia
indicated that in evaluating an Indian law issue, the judiciary decides "what the
current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all legislation, and the
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congressional 'expectations[;] "' legislation is not essential.? ' Justice Scalia's
statement effectively amounts to a sharing of plenary power'" over Indian affairs
between Congress and the judiciary.
Early Supreme Court decisions gave meaning to the Stevens' treaty language by attempting to effectuate the parties' intent on the date of treaty formation. This line of reasoning reached its zenith with Judge Boldt's 1979 decision
in United States v. Wahington, where the court decided that the Indians' reasonable expectations at the time of treaty formation amounted to a reserved, federally protected right to fifty percent of the harvestable salmon, taken essentially
anywhere. Judge Boldt's decision recognized that since Indians retained a right
to such a large portion of the salmon, their interests in fisheries management
decisions must be represented. And so, the decision mandated that Washington
use its position on an international fisheries counsel to promote Indian fishing
interests. That mandate culminated in the current realities of Indian participation
in fisheries management decisions at all levels. Because the Indians' interests in
the salmon transcends economic concerns, and reside in a religious place where
conservation plays a central role, their involvement in fisheries management
decisions can bring nothing but hope to salmon's future.
V. CONCLUSION

Salmon constitutes big business in the Pacific Northwest. Commercial fishermen from the United States, Canada, and distant nations, take salmon from the
Northwest to worldwide markets. International and domestic agreements recognize the United States' obligation to the Indians, and divide the total take between Indians and non-Indians at roughly fifty-percent. Non-Indian, commercial
fishermen in the United States recognize that their livelihood depends on the
total number of available salmon. The most obvious method to increase the harvestable portion of salmon is to increase their overall population. Since the Indians control half of the harvestable portion of salmon, they occupy and essential
place at the negotiation table.
The nature of salmon migration patterns demands a holistic approach to
fisheries management, and such coordination is difficult given the many jurisdictional boundaries a single migrating salmon passes through.'" Through domestic and international avenues, the United States attempts to manage the
salmon population. The Supreme Court interpreted the Stevens Treaties to grant
fifty-percent of the salmon take to Indian fishermen, and the state may regulate
Indian fishing only to the extent necessary for conservation purposes. Through
Congress and the courts, Indians assert authority over decisions that affect the
entire salmon population. These efforts continue to bolster salmon recovery and
bring salmon management strategies more in line with Indian values. Judge
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Boldt's decision in 1974 not only solidified Indian fishing rights, but also produced a victory for salmon mitigation and conservation efforts.
James T. Johnson*

